and reproductive health for the U.S. population. The reported response rate for the survey, weighted to reflect the two-stage sample design, is 78 percent. Details of sample design and response rate calculation are reported in Lepkowski et al. (2006) . Religion is not a primary focus of the survey, but some questions on religion, including religious affiliation, frequency of attendance at religious services and importance of religion, are included to allow for analysis of religious variation in fertility and family behavior.
In some previous studies of religion and fertility, frequency of religious attendance has been used to measure the strength of religious commitment. However, attendance has been shown to be strongly (albeit non-linearly) influenced by marital status and by the age and number of children living in the home, and so is not ideal for cross-sectional analysis using fertility as an outcome variable (Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy and Waite 1995) .
Instead, this analysis uses the importance of religion in daily life as a measure of religiosity. All respondents were asked if they had any religious affiliation. Those respondents who identified a religion were then asked about the importance of religion in their daily life, with options of responding that religion was very important, somewhat important, or not important. Respondents who reported no religion were combined with those who said that religion was not important to create a single variable representing three levels of religiosity.
This variable is a measure of the prominence or salience of religion as an aspect of individual identity. Some research in the sociology of religion points to differences between conservative and liberal religious beliefs as an important source of differences in social and political attitudes (e.g., Wuthnow 1988 Wuthnow ,1996 . The importance of religion may capture variation along the liberal-conservative belief axis as well as individual salience; at the macro level, Inglehart and Baker (2000) find a strong correlation between the importance of God in your life and a range of "traditional" beliefs including conservative religious beliefs. For convenience, we occasionally refer to the importance of religion as "religiosity," or label women for whom religion is more important as "more religious." We do not mean to suggest that this variable is the only way of conceptualizing religious belief.
Overall, 50 percent of women said religion was very important, and 31 percent said religion was somewhat important in their daily lives. The remaining 19 percent of women had no religious affiliation or said religion was not important in their daily lives (Table 1) . Reported importance of religion is correlated with current religious affiliation and attendance. Protestants are more likely than Catholics to report that religion is very important to them (65 percent vs. 49 percent); among Protestant denominations, those belonging to fundamentalist Protestant denominations (80 percent) and Baptists and Southern Baptists (70 percent) are most likely to be in the "very important" group. Frequent attenders are the most likely to say religion is important to them, with 88 percent of those who go to church weekly saying religion is very important. However, religious attendance and importance are not perfectly correlated -21 percent of women who rarely attend church report that religion is very important in their everyday life.
Reported importance of religion is also associated with other sociodemographic factors, most notably age. The proportion of women who feel that religion is very important to them increases from 43 percent of women ages 15-19 to 58 percent of women ages 40-44. Black women are more likely to report that religion is very important (70 percent) compared to either Hispanic (55 percent) or white non-Hispanic (44 percent) women. Where sample size permitted, we replicated analyses separately for non- Hispanic whites, blacks and Hispanic women; results from these analyses are available from the authors on request. Differences by importance of religion persisted across all racial-ethnic groups and were similar in magnitude, indicating that observed differences are not a by-product of the racial composition of these groups. Before proceeding to a discussion of religious differences in fertility, we consider issues of causality in studying religion and fertility. Childbearing has been shown to lead to higher religious attendance (Stolzenburg, Blair-Loy and Waite 1995) . This increase may be due to parents' desire to enroll their children in Sunday school or other religious activities, a mechanism that is less applicable to an attitude-based measure such as self-rated importance of religion. In addition, importance of religion is likely to be more stable over the life course than religious attendance or denominational affiliation. It is possible, however, that having children may change women's outlook and values in ways that make religion more important to them. Reverse causation is therefore likely.
We minimize this problem by using measures of fertility as close in time to the survey as possible. We use births over the past five years to describe fertility timing and levels of unwanted fertility. In the second section of our analysis, we use intended fertility, rather than actual fertility, as an outcome measure; causal order is less a problem in this section of the analysis.
Describing Intended and Actual Fertility

Conceptual Framework
In order to explain continued higher fertility of women for whom religion is more important, we must first understand the sources of the differential. Fertility differences due to high levels of unplanned fertility, for example, would suggest different types of explanations than fertility differences due to differences in fertility timing. To identify the determinants of fertility differentials, we turn to a conceptual framework first proposed by Bongaarts (2001) and elaborated by Bongaarts (2002) and Morgan Morgan and Hagewen 2005; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003) . This framework builds on an earlier demographic approach to explaining fertility differences in high-fertility populations, the proximate determinants model (Bongaarts 1978) . The proximate determinants model decomposes aggregate fertility into its biological precursors (average coital frequency, average length of postpartum abstinence, population prevalence of birth control use). In contemporary industrialized countries, use of birth control is almost universal, and biological factors such as the frequency of sexual activity are of little use in explaining variation in birth rates. The more recent Bongaarts model describes a set of fertility determinants more appropriate for low-fertility populations. Specifically, current aggregate fertility levels (the total fertility rate, the sum of the period age-specific birth rates) can be decomposed into the following components:
That is, the TFR equals the intended parity of women increased or decreased by a set of model parameters that reflect forces not incorporated into women's reports of their childbearing intentions. The foundation of this framework is the concept of IP. If all women realize their parity intention, then the TFR = IP. The model parameters that can inflate completed parity vis-à-vis intended fertility include: unwanted fertility (F u ), replacement of children that may have died (F r ), and additional children needed to satisfy strong gender preferences (F g ). These effects all lead to having more children than initially intended; the parameters are thus greater than 1.0.
Other parameters (at least in recent periods) would be expected to take on values less than 1.0 and thus reduce fertility relative to intentions. These factors include changes in the timing of fertility (F t ), subfecundity and infecundity (F i ), and competition with other energy and time intensive activities that may lead persons to revise downward their intentions (F c ), especially at older ages. This model places intended parity at the core of a conceptual model of contemporary fertility, and provides a framework for understanding fertility intentions and the set of factors that modify or frustrate them. The model is an aggregate-level model, not an individual-level model; in particular, the multiplicative relationships cannot be generalized to individual fertility behavior. Here, we use this framework to determine the role of fertility intentions in producing religious differences in U.S. fertility.
Data and Measures
Data come from the 2002 NSFG, described above. All women in the survey are asked how many children they have had, if any, and report the dates of all live births. For each pregnancy, women are asked if they wanted to become pregnant at that time, later, or not at all. In a separate section, women are asked whether they were using contraception at the time they became pregnant, and if not, if they were not using contraception specifically in order to become pregnant. We take measures of fertility, unintended fertility and fertility timing from these reproductive histories.
We discuss both completed fertility and total fertility rate. Completed fertility is simply the number of children ever born to a woman at the survey date. The TFR is an aggregate measure describing population fertility behavior, calculated by adding up the age-specific fertility rates for all age groups. The TFR is usually interpreted as the number of children a woman would have if current age-specific fertility rates were applied throughout her lifetime. The TFR is a period measure, in this case based on fertility rates over the five years prior to the 2002 survey. It is possible that women become more religious with the birth of each child. However, we believe that giving birth in the recent past is less likely to increase perceived importance of religion than cumulative fertility over the lifetime, and that the TFR is therefore less subject to reverse causation than completed fertility.
Unwanted fertility is measured using a direct question about the wantedness of recent births. As has become standard, births are labeled as unwanted if the mother reported intending no more children at the time of a particular pregnancy (that subsequently ended in a live birth). All births during the past five years are included and classified by the reported religiosity of the mother at the time of the survey. A substantial literature on unwanted fertility has shown that retrospective reports underestimate levels of unwanted fertility, because women are reluctant to label an existing child as unwanted (e.g. Joyce, Kaestner and Korenman 2002; Westoff and Ryder 1977; Williams and Abma 2000) . It is possible that women for whom religion is very important are more prone to this type of post-hoc rationalization than less religious women. Data on contraceptive use or non-use at conception have been hypothesized to be less sensitive to reporting bias (Crissey 2005; Guzman, Manlove and Moore 2006; Hayford and Guzzo 2006) . We therefore also report levels of unplanned fertility classified by religiosity of mother at the time of the survey. We use contraceptive use histories to identify births resulting from pregnancies when the mother was not deliberately trying to conceive.
The timing factor in the Bongaarts model, F t , is a technical correction for the distorting effects of cohort changes in fertility timing on period measures of TFR. The impact of changes in the timing of childbearing can be approximated using a correction suggested by Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) . The data requirements for calculating this correction factor are intensive, requiring information on parity-specific changes in mean age at birth within each religious group. We attempted to calculate the BongaartsFeeney correction factor using data from the NSFG, but because of the small number of births in each parity-religiosity group, estimates were unstable: The standard errors for our calculated timing changes were larger than the actual timing changes calculated based on vital statistics reports of all births in the United States. To get a sense of differences in fertility timing across religiosity groups, we calculated mean age at first and second birth for births during the past five years by level of religiosity.
Biological differences in the ability to achieve intended parity are represented by F i , the level of sub-and infecundity. Differences in F i are largely attributable to differences in the timing of first births; we do not calculate F i directly but use differences in fertility timing to assess the probable impact of infecundity.
Intended family size is measured through a series of questions asking women about their intended future childbearing. For women who are married or cohabiting, intentions refer to joint intentions with the current partner; for single women, intentions refer to their own behavior. During the interview, a preface to the questions on fertility intentions distinguishes intentions from desires: "Sometimes what people want and what they intend are different because they are not able to do what they want." It is further specified that the questions refer to intentions rather than desires. Thus, for example, women who are sterile are assigned a response of zero children intended, regardless of whether they would like to have (more) children. The number of children each woman intends to have is added to the number of children she has at the time of the survey in order to calculate her intended family size. In the Bongaarts framework, intended parity is measured as the average intended fertility of women age 20-24. This measure represents the desired family size of women at the start of their childbearing years; because fertility intentions have been stable over the past thirty years in the United States, the intentions of young women can be used to model current period fertility among women of all ages .
Decomposing Differences in Fertility
Figure 1 provides the first hints that intentions are the driving force behind religious fertility differences within the United States. This figure shows average intended and actual fertility by importance of religion for different age groups of women in the 2002 NSFG. There is little difference in children ever born between women for whom religion is very important and not religious women at age 18-24. However, at these ages women who report that religion is very important to them have higher intended fertility than other women, and at older ages more religious women have both higher intentions and higher numbers of children ever born. Among women age 40-44, completed fertility for women who report that religion is very important to them is .4 children higher than that among women for whom religion is only somewhat important and .8 children higher than women who are not religious.
These data are cross-sectional and do not represent actual cohort behavior, but the hypothetical cohort depicted in this graph is suggestive. Further, because fertility intentions have been largely stable for several decades, actual cohort data look very similar to that shown in Figure 1 . (Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003 show the evolution of intentions and behavior for an actual cohort, though they do not break down fertility by religiosity.) Note in Figure 1 that the intention-by-age (dashed) lines are roughly parallel, with differences between the very and somewhat important groups varying between 0.2 and 0.5, and differences between the very and not important groups ranging from 0.6 to 0.9 children. Thus the higher completed fertility of women for whom religion is important may simply reflect their success at fulfilling higher childbearing intentions, and the other factors shown in equation 1 may not vary greatly across religious groups. Alternatively, the parameters inflating/deflating fertility in equation 1 may differ across religious groups but be largely offsetting, resulting in similar degrees of depression of intentions for all three groups.
1
To explore further the link between intended and achieved fertility, we first calculated the period TFR for women in the three religiosity groups. Period-based total fertility rates (Table 2 ) are similar to the completed Figure 1 ; as expected, women for whom religion is most important have the highest fertility, followed by women for whom religion is somewhat important, with women for whom religion is not important having the lowest birth rates. Women experiencing the fertility rates observed among very religious women between 1997 and 2002 throughout their lifetime would have on average 2.3 children, half a child more than women for whom religion is not important. We then examined the F parameters from equation 1. Of the three parameters that might inflate observed fertility relative to intentions, (F u , F r , F g ), unwanted fertility is most likely to be important.
2 Past research suggests that religious women are less likely to use contraception or use less effective contraceptive methods, although effects vary by age and affiliation (Brewster et al. 1998; Goldscheider and Mosher 1991) . Religious women may also be less likely to abort unintended pregnancies. We therefore expected that women for whom religion was very important would have higher levels of unintended fertility than other women. Table 2 shows the proportion of births in the past five years that were unwanted or unplanned for the three religiosity groups. Differences are modest and, contrary to our expectations, in the direction of higher unintended fertility among those for whom religion is less important. This finding may result from under-reporting of unwanted births by women for whom religion is important, but this kind of measurement error is unlikely to apply to unplanned fertility. Thus, there is no evidence for our initial expectation and no reason to believe that unintended fertility contributes to the observed higher fertility among women for whom religion is more important.
Several factors (F t , F i , F c ) have been shown to deflate fertility behavior relative to intentions in international comparisons. Fertility postponement lowers the TFR and accounts for a substantial portion of the fertility variation across developed countries (Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002) . Simple tabulations of mean age at first birth by importance of religion show that the women who reported religion was very important were slightly older at first birth than women in the not important group (table 2) . As with unintended fertility, differences in the timing of fertility run contrary to expectations, in this case that postponement would be greater among women for whom religion is less important. 3 Infecundity (F i ) represents shortfalls of fertility (vis-à-vis intentions) due to sub or infecundity. The impact of this factor should be positively associated with age at childbearing. Since there is little evidence that age at childbearing varies across these religiosity groups, F i seems unimportant in accounting for differences too.
Downward revisions in intentions due to competition between childbearing and other activities, F c , cannot be examined in this crosssectional data set. Our expectation is that women for whom religion is more important would be less likely to revise intentions downward because they are more traditional/family oriented. Under this hypothesis, the process of differential downward revisions would contribute to the religious differentials we document; the hypothetical (cross-sectional) cohort data in Figure 1 do show some widening of intended fertility differences with age.
Explaining Differences in Intended Fertility
Data and Methods
This section of the analysis examines the relationship between importance of religion and intended family size in order to determine whether this association can be explained by differences in socio-demographic characteristics or is part of a broader conservative family orientation. The analysis studies 1,354 women age 20-24 interviewed in the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth. The analysis studies women in their early 20s, who are in the early stages of family formation. These women are old enough to have developed ideas about what kind of family they would like to have, but are young enough so that these ideas reflect intentions and ideology rather than past behavior.
Intended family size is measured as described in the previous section. Models control for background characteristics expected to be associated with both fertility intentions and importance of religion: age, race/ethnicity, education and family background. The young women in the sample may not yet have completed their education, so education is measured using two dichotomous variables, whether the respondent has a high school degree and whether she has ever attended college. The analysis includes two measures of family background, whether the respondent lived with both biological parents at age 14 and the educational attainment of the respondent's mother.
The models also control for whether the respondent has ever been married, since previous research has found that religious differences in fertility are partly due to differences in marriage timing (Mosher, Williams and Johnson 1992) and for current parity. The analysis can be interpreted as modeling the number of additional children desired by women age 20-24. On average, women in the sample already have 25 percent of the children they intend; 19 percent of the women in the sample intend no additional children. Controlling for current parity accounts for the possibility that higher fertility intentions result from early childbearing. Including current parity may introduce endogeneity into the model if women for whom religion is more important have children earlier than other women. We tested models which did not include parity; results were the same for religion variables, although coefficients for some control variables (notably race and education) changed under this specification.
The 2002 NSFG includes a series of questions measuring the respondent's attitudes toward various aspects of family formation and sexuality. Respondents are asked whether they agree, strongly agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of a series of 13 statements. "Neither agree nor disagree" was not offered to respondents as an option, but was available as a response for respondents who insisted. The full text of the questions is shown in Table 3 , along with means for the whole sample and for each religiosity group. Variation in family attitudes by importance of religion is as expected, with women for whom religion is more important holding more conservative family values. It is interesting to note that the strength of this relationship varies across measures. For example, more than three times as many women for whom religion is very important believe that young people should not cohabit as women for whom religion is not important. Attitudes toward homosexuality also differ widely, with 74 percent of women in the not important group accepting same-sex relationships compared to only 29 percent of women in the very important group. Attitudes toward parenthood, on the other hand, show little variation by religion, with more than 90 percent of all groups agreeing that parenthood is worth the costs.
Attitude variables are included in the model by constructing an additive index representing traditional family ideology. One point is added to the index for each conservative statement that the respondent agreed with, and one point is added for each permissive statement that the respondent disagreed with; means for the attitude index are also included in Table  3 . In exploratory analysis, we tested models using all attitude variables together, each attitude variable separately, and different combinations of the attitude measures, including content-based subgroups (e.g., only gender attitudes, only marriage attitudes). Substantive conclusions from models using the additive index were almost identical to those from models using all attitude variables for the religion variables, the main interest here, and very similar for other variables. The final model used the constructed index variable for the sake of parsimony. Details of index construction and model selection are described in the Appendix.
Results are presented as a series of nested models. In Model 1, only measures of the importance of religion are included. Model 2 adds socio-demographic characteristics, and Model 3 adds family attitudes. All regressions are run using OLS regression with intended family size as the dependent variable. Given the distribution of intended family size, Poisson or negative binomial models might be technically more appropriate for this analysis. Results were robust to the specification of the model; linear regression was chosen for the convenience of interpretation of coefficients.
Results
Model 1 confirms that women for whom religion is important in daily life have higher fertility intentions (Table 4 ). Compared to non-religious women, who intend two children on average, women for whom religion is somewhat important intend .31 additional children and women for whom religion is very important in daily life intend .69 additional children. The differences by importance of religion are statistically significant at the .001 level. Additional tests (not shown) indicate that the difference between very religious and somewhat religious women is also statistically significant. In Model 2, measures of socio-demographic characteristics are added to the model. The magnitudes of the measures of importance of religion are virtually unchanged from Model 1: Compositional differences do not explain the higher intended fertility of women for whom religion is important. In fact, within this sample of young women, few socio-demographic characteristics are related to fertility intentions -only education has a statistically significant association with intended parity.
Model 3 incorporates a summary index measuring attitudes toward family formation and sexuality. Differences between religious women and women for whom religion is not important remain statistically significant in this model. However, the magnitudes of the differences are attenuatedthey are about half the size of the unadjusted coefficient for very religious women (.34 vs. .69), and about two-thirds for somewhat religious women (.24 vs. .31). In addition, the difference between very and somewhat religious women is no longer statistically significant once attitudes toward family formation are included in the model.
On average, a one-point increase in the traditional family attitudes index is associated with an increase in intended family size of .12 children. In exploratory analysis (described in the Appendix), we tested to see whether differences in expected fertility were primarily explained by some subset of the attitude measures. For example, some previous research has hypothesized that the higher fertility of religious women may be explained by more conservative attitudes about gender roles. In this case, no one attitude or set of attitudes explained a large part of the relationship between fertility intentions and religion. Instead, each additional attitude measure included in the regression increased the explanatory power of the model and attenuated the religion coefficients.
Discussion
These results show that the family attitudes questions included in the NSFG act as a set of imperfect measures of a broad and diffuse traditional family orientation, rather than representing distinct dimensions of family values. Some of the attitude measures are explicitly pronatalist (parenting is worth it), while others are neutral with respect to fertility (same sex relationships are not acceptable). The association between traditional family attitudes, importance of religion and higher intended family size is consistent across each of these attitude questions. The consistency of this association suggests that the relationship between fertility intentions and family values is not the result of behavioral intervening variables, but represents a conceptual linkage between family size and other aspects of family formation. This analysis cannot determine whether religion or family conservatism is the main causal factor behind the association -it may be that women for whom religion is more important develop more conservative attitudes, or that women with more traditional family values are drawn to religion. Even after adding measures of family values to the models, a large and statistically significant relationship between importance of religion and fertility intentions remains. Additional models (results available from authors) tested whether other aspects of religious belief might explain this relationship. The primary independent variable, the importance of religion in the respondent's everyday life, is based on individual interpretation of religion and may not capture effects of religiosity that operate through church institutional structures or through the social influence of other church goers. These effects would presumably be strongest among frequent church-goers. The supplementary models included measures of the frequency of religious attendance in addition to the importance of religion and family values, and tested for interactions between attendance and importance variables. The coefficients for the attendance variables were small and not statistically significant, and the coefficients for other variables did not change when religious attendance was added to the model. Interaction terms were also not statistically significant. Attendance at religious services may be associated with higher fertility intentions, but this possible association is a component of the association between importance of religion and intended family size and does not explain additional variation.
Conclusions
Women who describe religion as "very important" have higher fertility than women for whom religion is "somewhat important" or "not important." We trace these fertility differentials to differences in fertility intentions; other proposed proximate mechanisms such as higher unintended fertility or earlier childbearing among women for whom religion is important do not play a large role in explaining overall fertility differences. But why do the more religious want more children? A substantial portion of the difference is associated with differences in family ideology, including schemas about the importance of marriage and parenthood, the acceptability of nonmarital sexual relations, and gender roles in families. Results suggest that fertility differentials are part of a widespread association between religiosity and family behavior, rather than an expression of a specifically pro-natalist orientation associated with a particular religion.
The joint association between importance of religion, fertility intentions and family values reflects the connection between religion and family in the construction of personal identity. During the period under study, the association between religion and conservative family values is strong, visible and vocal. Religious-based political organizations like the Christian Coalition and Concerned Women for America advocate a return to Christian values; their agenda prominently features pro-family policies such as opposition to abortion and gay marriage and abstinence-only curricula in school sexed programs. Outside of the explicitly political arena, movements such as the Promise Keepers (encouraging Christian men to become involved husbands and fathers) and True Love Waits (promoting abstinence until marriage among Christian teenagers) reinforce the association between religion and traditional family orientation. These organizations are largely led by conservative Protestants, but attract mainstream Protestant and Catholic members as well. The visibility of religion and "family values" in American public and political discourse may increase the salience of both religion and fertility as elements of personal identity in the United States. For example, Lesthaeghe and Neidert (2006) show strong state-and countylevel associations between levels and timing of fertility, cohabitation and marriage, and political indicators such as the percent voting for Bush in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. They argue that these aerial aggregate associations are explained by the density of secular vs. religious orientations across states and counties in the United States.
Religious and family values are conjoined by the "culture wars" of the past few decades. There are numerous schemas at play in American society and many are widely shared, suggesting that "culture war" is less apt than terms like cultural "battles" or "skirmishes." Nevertheless, these skirmishes have received great media attention and constitute historical "events" that have impacted the social landscape and individual identities. This social history produces the new structure (i.e., patterned behavior) observed. The higher fertility of those for whom religion is an important aspect of identity flows from these forces and helps to perpetuate them. The longevity of this new structure depends upon the micro-macro dynamics at the intersection of contemporary ideology, politics, religion and the family. The outcomes will be visible in institutional change, in important sources of contemporary identity, and in behavior such as fertility.
Notes
1. For example, women for whom religion is very important might have lower unwanted fertility rates (F u ) but postpone childbearing less (F t ) that the less religious. If the product of these two factors approximates 1.0, then together they have no overall impact on the TFR. Our initial expectation was that differences in the F parameters would accumulate so as to be largely responsible for religious differences in fertility behavior. This is the case for cross-national differences (see Quesnel-Vallee and Morgan 2003) .
2. The F values need to be both large and substantially different across groups in order to produce religious differences. F r and F g are small in the U.S. context; even if they varied by a factor of 2 or 3 they would not impact religious differences greatly (see Morgan and Hagewen 2005) .
3. The counter-intuitive relationship between importance of religion and birth timing is due partly to lower rates of non-marital fertility among women for whom religion is very important: When analysis is limited to marital births, the most religious women are slightly younger at first birth than less religious women. Norms about marital childbearing may depress fertility among religious women relative to women for whom religion is not important. The higher proportion of unintended births among the least religious women, on the other hand, holds for both marital and non-marital births. Better for all if man earns main living .
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.58
.28
.43
More important for man to spend time with family than have success in career .
11
.66
.31
.12
Groups of Attitude Questions in Model
Additive index .15
.34
.24
All attitude variables .17
Only gender attitudes .
13
.57
.30
Only marriage attitudes .
Only homosexuality attitudes .
12
.59
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Only parenthood attitudes .
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.63
Notes: Results from OLS regression of intended fertility on importance of religion and other characteristics. Data are from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth. Sample: women age 20-24 with no missing values on attitude questions or importance of religion, N = 1354. All models include socio-demographic controls as described in text and listed in Table 4 . All coefficients are statistically significant, p � .05, except for coefficients in italics not statistically different from zero. Gender attitudes = working mom can establish secure relationship with child, better if man earns main living. Marriage attitudes = better to get married than stay single, divorce best solution. Homosexuality attitudes = same sex relations ok, gay adults should have right to adopt. Parenthood attitudes = rewards of being a parent are worth it.
Notes: Results from OLS regression of intended fertility on importance of religion and other characteristics. Data are from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth. Sample: women age 20-24 with no missing values on attitude questions or importance of religion, N = 1354. All models include socio-demographic controls as described in text and listed in Table 4 . All coefficients are statistically significant, p ,
.05, except
for coefficients in italics not statistically different from zero. Gender attitudes = working mom can establish secure relationship with child, better if man earns main living. Marriage attitudes = better to get married than stay single, divorce best solution. Homosexuality attitudes = same sex relations ok, gay adults should have right to adopt. Parenthood attitudes = rewards of being a parent are worth it.
